Abstract: A U.S.-based geographer and Belarusian political scientist assess the current economiccrisisinBelarus.Althoughthecountry'sfinancialsituationisseriousintheshort term, they argue that analysis of basic social and economic indicators provides some evidence of underlying strength and stability, recently bolstered by a number of trade agreements concluded with Russia in late 2011. The authors argue that the most natural and meaningful basis for ascertaining the health of the country's economy is to compare it with those of its two Slavic neighbors, Russia and Ukraine. That comparison reveals that although Belarus ranks lower on most indices of economic reform, it has outperformed them during the post-Soviet period in several important categories (GDP growth, income equality, agricultural productivity, expenditures on education and health care, life expectancy, and per capita agricultural output) and occupied an intermediate position (below Russia but above Ukraine) in others (e.g.,GDPpercapita,wagesandpensions,andlaborproductivity).Thepaper'sfinalsection discusses the nature of the relationship between Belarus and Russia (dependence vs. complementarity) and that between the Lukashenka regime and the Belarusian people. Journal of Economic Literature,ClassificationNumbers:E600,G010,H500,P200,P300.5figures, 8 tables, 101 references.
INTRODUCTION D
uring the course of the past 15 years, Belarus has earned the distinction of being the world's leader in the sheer number of dire predictions about its imminent economic collapse. And yet since 1996, the country has demonstrated steady, impressive and, in the words of a 2005 World Bank report, "broad-based" economic growth (Ioffe, 2011b) . The many doomsayers, however, may now seem vindicated as Belarus's current economic predicament can hardly be trivialized, irrespective of one's political leanings. In May 2011, the country's national bank devalued the Belarusian ruble by 56 percent, with one U.S. dollar exchanging for 3155 rubles on May 23 and 4930 rubles on May 24 (Belarus Just, 2011) . The broadly definedreasonfortheruble'sdevaluationatsuchhighscalehasbeenthenationaltreasury's inability to sustain future outlays, most of which in an open economy exporting 60 percent of its GDP, rely on stable inflow of hard currency. One such outlay comprised wages and salaries paid by state-run companies. In 2005 and again 2010, the IMF criticized Belarusian authorities for boosting wages to unsustainable levels (Mezhdunarodny, 2005; IMF Criticizes, 2010) . 2 In January-February 2011, the wage component of Belarus's GDP amounted to 51.4 percent, or 11.9 percent above the share of the previous year.
3 Not only wages but also the overall level of social spending has arguably been beyond Belarus's means. For example, the IMF suggested in its March 2011 report that "the scale of the government housing program needs to be brought down to a sustainable level" (IMF Country Report, 2011a) . The IMF team also noted that "Belarus spends about 14 percent of GDP in publicly provided subsidies." 4 Ontopofunsustainablewagesandsocialspending,thereweretwosetsofcircumstances whoseconfluenceprecipitatedthecountry'scurrenteconomiccrisis.Thefirst(longer-term) was the substantial price hike on Russian oil and gas. From 2006 to 2011, the overall cost of both for Belarus increased 4.5 times, which aggravated the country's negative international trade balance. A particularly painful change occurred in 2009 when Russia re-imposed an export tariff on oil exported to Belarus. From 2005 to 2010, the excess of imports over exports had grown from $729 million to $9600 million despite significant expansion of Belarus's exports (Osnovnyye,2011) .Arguably,thisimbalancehasbeenthelargestsinglereasonfor Belarus's ongoing crisis.
The second set of circumstances involved a pre-announced quadrupling (in February 2011) of Belarus's import tariff on used cars, intended to become effective on July 1, 2011 (Tamozhennaya, 2011; Mozheyko and Yerokhina, 2011 )-an increase resulting from Belarus's accession to the Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan which prompted the hike in order to match Russia's; in essence the measure aimed to protect Russia's car industry from foreign competition. Anticipating losses, thousands of Belarusian shuttle traders rushed to Germany to buy more than 250,000 mostly used cars from February to May 2011, or more than the total of 175,000 they purchased during the entire year of 2010. By some accounts, the total spent on used foreign cars from late February to July 1, 2011, was close to $3 billion (Lukashenko, 2011a) .
As money needed for such purchases came from the currency exchange outlets of Belarusian banks, the latter soon reported a shortage of hard currency. In late March 2011, hard currency altogether disappeared from the country's exchange outlets, 5 whereupon the end of unobstructed access to hard currency provoked a consumer panic, 6 with Belarusians promptly stocking up on such necessities as sugar, salt, and vinegar. In June and July 2011, grocery stores in Minsk and other places in Belarus still looked well supplied, but prices 2 Incidentally, in both cases the criticisms were issued on the eve of presidential elections (and called pre-election giveaways) . 3 The analyst reporting that outlay opined that no economy could withstand such a level of "social generosity." For comparison, the wage component in early 2011 was 39.5 percent in Russia, 37.5 percent in Norway, and 30.9 percent in Italy (Nikolyuk, 2011) . 4 The report went on to note that "Subsidies take the form of direct transfers to households (for families with children, special groups, and for scholarships) or indirect transfers, where the cost of certain goods and services is maintainedatadesiredlowlevelusingbudgetresources.Examplesofthelatterincludesubsidizedutilitiesandpublic transportation, subsidized loans for housing purchases and construction, reduced VAT on food, and tax exemptions onutilitiesandhousingconstruction.Indirectsubsidiesincludealsosupportgrantedtospecificeconomicsectors,in particular construction and agriculture. Belarus provides a higher level of subsidies compared to peers (Russia, CIS, andEastCentralEurope)"(ibid.).
5 From late March until September 2011, only individuals proving a need to go abroad for study, medical treatment, or burial of family members were allowed to purchase hard currency at four banking institutions. 6 In an interview by Grigory Ioffe on July 26, 2011, then-acting chairman of the Belarus National Bank Yuriy AlymovstatedthattheMarch2011publication(inRussianandEnglish)bytheIMFoftheaddendatoitsreporton Belarus (despite the BNB request to cancel that publication) also contributed to panic because the published material revealedthatBNB'shardcurrencyreserveshaddeclinedto$3.4billionatatimewhenthecurrentaccountdeficit amounted to $8 billion (Dudko, 2011). were growing rapidly.
7 FromJanuarytoJuly2011,Belarusregisteredahigherlevelofinflation (41 percent) than any other CIS country (S Nachala, 2011) , so that by the end of 2011 inflationmaylikelyrisetoabout100percent.Theensuingmeatshortagesingrocerystores acrossBelaruswerefirstreportedinlateAugust2011,andblamedonRussianshoppingtours (Pravitel'stvo, 2011) . Indeed, after the devaluation of the Belarusian ruble, the attractiveness of the country's retail outlets to customers from nearby Russian provinces (e.g., Smolensk) increased dramatically.
In sum, the situation looks quite bleak, as Belarus is in need of substantial funds to be borrowedforimprovingitscurrentaccountdeficitandmaintainingthenewexchangerateof the Belarusian ruble.
8 Onepossiblesourceofliquiditytotemporarilypatchtheholeinthe current account could be another loan from the IMF (in addition to the ones received in 2009 and2010),forwhichBelarusappliedonMay31,2011.However,onSeptember12,2011,the IMFannounceditsdecisiontotheeffectthat"financialsupportfromtheFundwouldrequire strong and demonstrated commitments by the authorities" (IMF Country Report, 2011b) . In other words, current commitments have not been deemed adequate, although the IMF kept the dooropenbydispatchinganewmissiontoMinsk(October5-17,2011)toreviewthecountry'sfiscalandmonetaryaffairs (IMFSays,2011) .TheIMF'sresponseappearstosuggest that it may have caved in to political pressure 9 -a possibility not lost on Belarus's President Lukashenka, who accused the institution sworn to political impartiality of setting political preconditions (Lukashenko, 2011b) .
Anotherpossible inflowofreadilyavailablecash maycomefromsellingsome major state-owned enterprises to foreign corporate groups. Russian oligarchs seem poised to buy any of them without much hesitation, but Belarus is enticing other potential buyers, if only to boost competition and consequently also the selling prices. From May to September 2011, the media have reported many "final" deals, with most only found misleading soon after publication. 10 Rather clearly, such deals involving the possible sale of the "family silver" as well as Russian and/or IMF loans, would only constitute temporary solutions, for in order tomakeendsmeetinthelongrunBelaruswouldneedtosignificantlyexpanditsexports, cut numerous subsidies, and unleash local entrepreneurial initiative.
11 Belarus made some progress by easing registration of new businesses, but this apparently has not as yet paid off, 7 For example, one of the authors saw retail prices for lean uncooked ham grow from 50,000 to 82,000 rubles per kilo from late June to late July 2011. At the same time, since price hikes in Belarusian rubles have not been nearly assignificantastheruble'sdevaluation,foodandrestaurantsactuallyhavebecomemoreaffordabletoallwitha steady inflow of hard currency (actually largely to members of the Belarusian opposition who enjoy substantial Western aid). For example, in July 2011 one could buy a three-course chicken dinner at a Minsk cafeteria for a price equivalent of $3.20.
8 Already in late August, a dollar was bought for as much as 9,000 rubles on the black market, almost 4000 rubles abovetheofficialrateof5,037rubles.Inmid-September,theBelarusianNationalBankeventuallyallowedafree floatoftheruble,whichfellto8,600rublestothedollar,butthenregainedsomeground:OnOctober31,2011,$1 was worth 8,450 rubles (Kurs dollara, 2011).
9 OnAugust1,2011,sixU.S.Senators(Cardin,Durbin,Kirk,Lieberman,McCain,andShaheen) sentaletterto Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner urging him not to support the possible IMF loan to Belarus (http://docs .rferl.org/ en-US/2011/08/03/b776d644-95e0-498e-a41e-685c3794e6d4.pdf).
10 Forexample,Belaruskali(amajorpotashfactorycontrollingabout13percentoftheworldmarket)wasfirst reportedtobeboughtbySuleimanKerimov(aRussianoligarch).Thenajointofferwaspublicized,involvinga$2 billion collateralized loan by Russia's Sberbank and Deutsche Bank based on 35 percent of Belaruskali's assets, whereupontheofferwasrepudiatedbyBelaruskali'sCEO.Subsequentlynewscameofanoffertoobtain25percent of Belaruskali by the government of India, and eventually a $1 billion non-collateralized loan by Russia's Sberbank was proclaimed a "done deal" by Belarus's Deputy Prime Minister, Sergey Rumas (Sberbank Rossii, 2011).
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UntilrecentlysuchinitiativesweremostlyconfinedtobuyingconsumergoodsatwholesalemarketsinRussia, Poland, and Turkey for resale in Belarus.
although in May and July 2011 the country did register a positive balance of its international trade (EksportPereprygnul,2011) .
ButevendespitethefairlyseriousnatureofBelarus'seconomicpredicament,itisdifficult to shrug off the impression that the amount of hard currency borrowing required by Belarus to normalizeitsfinancialdysfunctionisdwarfedbythefundschanneledbythe EuropeanUnion and IMF to salvage Greece, whose population is roughly similar in size as that of Belarus; whereas Greece is to receive $110 billion in aid, the amount required for Belarus is from $3 billion to $6 billion, according to the recent assessment by Moody's (Karney, 2011) .
12 It is of note that Belarus has been commended by the World Bank and IMF for its "satisfactory degree of transparency in formulation and implementation of its monetary policy" (IMF Country Report, 2006) and for the "complete and comprehensive set of information" made availablebythecountry'spublicfinancesystem (WorldBank,2009) .Severalotherfactors alsoleadustobelievethatBelarus'seconomicdifficulties,nomatterhowseriousatthistime, may be overcome due to Russia's decision to: (a) scrap export tariffs for oil sold to Belarus (December 2010); (b) more recently (November 25, 2011) , reduce natural gas prices scheduled to be sold to Belarus in 2012;
13 (c) purchase the remaining 50 percent of the shares of Beltransgaz (a Belarusian transit pipeline system, half of which had been owned by Gazprom since 2007) for $2.5 billion; 14 and (d) issue a $1 billion loan from Sberbank to Belaruskali. Moreover, the still untapped potential of privatization, as well as one of the reliable estimates that Belarus's exporters have about $5 billion on their foreign accounts (Prezident, 2011), appear to bode well for a favorable outcome.
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We can also visualize that even some elements of Belarus's economic development model (so much at odds with the neoliberal paradigm promoted for all post-communist countries) may be salvaged as well. 16 Inthemidstoftheongoingfinancialdistress,salariesofpublicsector employees (teachers, medical professionals, and government employees) were raised 55.1 percenttocompensatethemforthe50percentinflationrecordedfromJanuary1toSeptember 1, 2011 (Denezhnyye dokhody, 2011). 17 Regardless of the survival prospects for the above-mentioned economic model, it is instructive to review here the distinctive features of Belarus's pre-crisis economic development.Toaccomplishthisobjective,wewilluseacomparativeperspective,settingBelarus against Russia and Ukraine, the two countries (unlike Belarus) which the U.S. Commerce Department has long conferred the status of market economies. 12 Belarus and Greece have in common the unsustainable social burden carried by both state budgets. Greece's burden, however, is much heavier, and such ingredients of the Greek crisis as massive tax evasion (Surowiecki, 2011) do not seem to apply to Belarus, 13 The commitment is to lower the 2011 level of $280 per thousand cubic meters to $165, amounting to a savings of $3.0 billion annually (Klaskovsky, 2011) .
14 On Gazprom's efforts to gain control of the main natural gas pipelines through the transit states (Ukraine, Belarus,andMoldova),seeEricson (2009,p.51) .
15 EvenbeforereceivingsubstantialfinancialconcessionsfromRussia(infactmoresignificantthanmostobservers expected), knowledgeable observers such as Daniel Krutzinna (a German investment banker stationed in Minsk) reportedataOctober26,2011briefingattheCarnegieCenterforInternationalPeaceinWashington,D.C.thatMinsk had already achieved macroeconomic stabilization (Twenty Years, 2011) . 16 ForanexaminationoftheroleplayedbytheneoliberalparadigmintheglobalfinancialcrisisinCentraland EasternEuropeandtheformerUSSR,seeSmithandSwain(2010) .TheusualassumptionthattheBelarusianmodel can only be sustained by continuing discounts on Russian hydrocarbons will be discussed in the last section of this paper.
17 Also, college students in Minsk will now be able to take advantage of public transportation free of charge (Besplatnyy Proyezd, 2011).
To us, the most obvious reason to compare Belarus with these two countries is that Belarusians themselves most frequently compare developments at home with those in Russia andUkraine.AccordingtoaSeptember2009nationalsurveybytheIISEPS(anoppositionmindedpollingfirm)80percentofBelarusiansdonotevenconsiderRussiatobeaforeign country (Klaskovskiy, 2010) . And our own observations indicate that Belarusians view Ukraine similarly. Yet from 2001 to 2011, the number of Belarusians willing to pursue the creation of a union state with Russia declined from 80 percent to 40 percent (Kosarev, 2011) . It therefore appears that Belarusians view their own country as a better place to live. Indeed, in 2008, the number of Belarusians who said life in Belarus is better than in Russia exceeded the number ofthosewiththeoppositeopinionbyafactoroffive (Ioffe,2008,p.114) .Theimportance of these data is underscored by the fact that as a matter of principle Belarusians may not be averse to exchanging state sovereignty for a better life (e.g., see Silitski, 2010) . We consider this a unique vulnerability of Belarusians as a community, much underestimated by Western analysts, who view Belarus's dependency on Russia in purely economic and political terms. Needlesstosay,consideringnumerousfamilyconnectionsamongthecitizensofallthreeEast Slavic countries, and above all, the spread, if not dominance, of the Russian language in those countries, 18 Belarusians are better informed about developments in Russia and Ukraine than anywhere else. Much of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine were part of the same polity (the Soviet UnionandtheRussianEmpire)formorethan200years.AsVictorMartinovich,anopposition-mindedjournalist,mentionedinaRadioLibertytalkshow, Russia,Belarus,andUkraine aretheonlycountriesofEuropeinwhichmostpeopledidnotconsiderthe communistperiod in their history to be a result of foreign domination (Drakakhrust, 2011) .
Last but not least, at the end of the Soviet Union's life span, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine had the highest per capita GDP levels of any of the USSR's non-Baltic republics. Belarus, which historically lagged behind both Russia and Ukraine in terms of industrialization, experienced a surge during the last three decades of the Soviet Union's existence (Ioffe, 2004) . Roughly a dozen super-large industrial enterprises and scores of their technological subsidiaries, established in Belarus during the 1970s and 1980s, were entirely dependent on Russia forrawmaterialsand/orsemi-finishedproducts.Allwerecommissionedtomeetall-Union (notBelarusian)demand,andtoexporttoEurope.Considerablelevelingoflivingstandards withintheSovietUnionoccurredasaresultoffinancialtransfersfromthedonorrepublics (particularly Russia). 19 It appears that Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine had similar starting conditions on the eve of systemic transformations in their economies.
In what follows in this paper, we provide comparisons of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine across privatization strategies and such indicators as reform rankings, GDP growth, wages and pensions, income distribution, labor productivity, social spending and health, composite indices of well-being, and agricultural productivity. A concluding section offers an unorthodox interpretation of this comparison.
THREE EAST SlAVIC STATES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Reforms in all three states were initiated in a political setting heavily influenced by thecommunistpast.BorisYel'tsin,thefirstpresidentoftheRussianFederation,hadbeen 18 EspeciallyamongurbanpopulationseverywhereexceptwesternmostUkraine. 19 For example, if Russia's per capita GDP level in 1990 is set at 100, the corresponding index for Belarus would be 97 and for Ukraine 79 (Medvedev, 2005) . By contrast, the corresponding index for Turkmenistan was 46, Uzbekistan 38,andTajikistan31.Theidenticalcalculationforpersonalconsumptionyieldsthefollowingresults:Belarus93, Ukraine86,Turkmenistan59,Uzbekistan54,andTajikistan49(ibid. While in Russia and Ukraine former communists quickly transformed themselves into champions of unfettered capitalism, in Belarus the story was different. From the break-up of the Soviet Union until 1994, the country was run in Soviet fashion, with most economic and social institutions intact. In 1994, the post of president was introduced in Belarus, and the incumbent Prime Minister Kebich lost elections to Alexander Lukashenka. Unlike Yel'tsin and Kravchuk, Lukashenka did not belong to the Soviet nomenklatura, having worked as a state farm director before moving to Minsk in 1990 as a member of the parliament. Unlike his Russian and Ukrainian colleagues, however, Mr. Lukashenka did not show any preference for market reforms, let alone Western-style governance, and continued running Belarus in the manner of his predecessor-i.e., using command methods rather than promoting market mechanisms in the economy and pluralism in politics. Upon coming to power, Lukashenka stopped voucher privatization, which had barely begun, and retained subsidized transport and utilities and free health care and education. By that time (1995), most industrial workers worked barely 2-3 days per week (as plants ran out of supplies and could not dispose of their output), and had to eke out a living from the output of their kitchen gardens. Yet within roughly a year (by 1996) the industrial giants of Belarus had resumed their full-capacity work schedules, mostly due to restored ties with Russia. That was what Lukashenka had been voted in for in 1994, and he made good on his electoral promise (Ioffe, 2004) . After 1996, Belarus experienced a rather long period of steady economic growth, which from 2005 to 2008 was themostrapidinEurope.
Privatization
Meanwhile, in Russia and Ukraine the early 1990s were a time of fundamental transformation. Mass privatization was arguably the single most important policy that put these twolargerEastSlaviccountriesonadistinctpost-communistpath.InRussia,privatization became a widely publicized affair, with its own national heroes and anti-heroes. 21 The Russian economy had been largely privatized by 1996, when President Yel'tsin faced elections for his second term with opinion polls estimating his popularity as low as 2-3 percent. Nevertheless, he won, thanks (it is believed) mainly to the support of the oligarchs (the byproducts of privatization)andpossiblybystuffingballotboxes.InUkraine,privatizationwassimilarlyrapid, though it initially received less attention from international media. 20 Moreover, by some accounts, Shushkevich, now an ardent pro-Western liberal, had been on the KGB payroll (e.g., see Yakavenka and Patyomkin, 2007) . Indeed, to be attached to an American visitor as a tutor of Russian would havebeenunthinkableinthoseyearswithouttheKGB'sparticipation.TheAmericaninquestionwasLeeHarvey Oswald,wholivedinMinskfrom1959to1962andworkedataradiofactory.
21 A prominent example of the former is Lyonya Golubkov, a common Russian fellow wondering how to invest his voucherandeventuallyfindingnobetterchoicethanastockin"Khoper-Invest,"amutualfundthatwentbankrupta few years after its formation. Anti-heroes include oligarchs such as Boris Berezovskiy, Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, and Roman Abramovich as well as Kremlin privatization proponents such as Anatoliy Chubais and Alfred Koch.
As a result of privatization, politicians in Russia and Ukraine could no longer manage resource allocation at their discretion, as they surrendered property rights to the oligarchs. In these countries, many privatized companies, especially energy and mining giants, turned to offshoreoperationstominimizetheirfiscalobligationsandmaximizeprofits.WithgovernmentsinbothRussiaandUkraineweakandunabletoestablishandmaintainfiscaldiscipline, corruptionflourished,furtherunderminingsociety'sapprovalofmarketreform.InRussia,the firstwaveofprivatizationendedwiththeYukosaffair,whenaclashbetweenpresidentPutin and Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, led to the latter's imprisonment for tax evasion, and his companymadebankruptandsoldoffinpieces(e.g.,seeHanson,2009).InUkraine,the"Orange Revolution"concludedthefirstprivatizationwave,withalandmarkresaleofthecountry's steel giant Krivorozhstal to the British tycoon Lakshmi Mittal in 2005 for a sum exceeding by several times the original price paid by a local oligarch.
In Belarus, largely unreformed property relations enabled authorities to control the economy at both the macro and micro levels, through a network of ministries, departments, and state corporations inherited from Soviet Belorussia and kept largely intact. Privatization in Belarus amounted to incorporating state enterprises, with the stock capital in most cases held by the state. Fearing speculation and Russian-style property relations, a special law was enacted in the late 1990s to freeze any transactions involving the securities of privatized companies. This moratorium on privatization was withdrawn only in 2011, but Belarus still does not have a working stock market.
AccordingtoEBRDestimates,theprivatesectorintheBelaruseconomydoesnotexceed 25 percent of GDP, whereas in Russia and Ukraine it accounts for approximately 65 percent (EBRD,2011b).However,thesefiguresshouldnotbeinterpretedtomeanthereisnoserious private business in Belarus. While large Soviet-era processing factories (with more than 500 workers) are still run by the state, almost 90 percent of retail trade in the country is in private hands, and so are all mobile telecommunications; public catering and tourism are mostly private. There are even private kindergartens and schools, as well as medical centers and other kinds of social facilities. In July 2011, Georgiy Kouznetsov, Chairman of the Committee for State Property, caused a commotion in a newspaper interview, in which he proved that artificialobstaclestoprivatizationarecreatednotbythepresidentialadministrationbutby the directorate of state-run enterprises often acting in concert with their workers (Na Vore, 2011).
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Despitetheirinfluence,however,178state-runenterprisesareonthelisttobetransferred to private ownership within two years (ibid).
A radical transformation of property relations in Russia and Ukraine has certainly led to more dynamic economic and social reforms in these countries. Notably, private owners of privatized and brand new private companies demanded tax cuts, less administrative regulation, free trade regimes, and removal of price controls. Labor laws were relaxed, private companieswereallowedtobidforpublicprojects,andinRussiaeventhepensionsystemwas reformed according to Western neoliberal recommendations.
Becausetherewasnolarge-scaleprivatizationinBelarus,therealsowasnosignificant internal pressure to liberalize the economy. Thus, market reforms in the country were very slow and often inconsistent, frustrating domestic businesses and foreign observers. AccordingtoeconomicreformrankingsbytheEuropeanBankofReconstructionandDevelopment, Belarus has consistently ranked as one of the least-reformed states in the post-communist world (Table 1) . By contrast, Russia and Ukraine had some of the best rankings not only in the formerSovietUnion,butalsoamongallpost-communistcountries.Especiallylowhasbeen Belarus' standing for large-scale privatization, while for Russia and Ukraine this particular indicator has been quite high and in line with post-communist averages.
Economic Growth
Assuming that post-communist reforms have been conducted not for their own sake but forthepurposeofboostingeconomicefficiencyandconsequentlypublicwell-being,itwould nowbereasonabletocomparethethreeEastSlaviccountries'achievementsintherealmof economic growth. Because all three experienced similar initial conditions following the disintegration of the USSR but took different approaches with respect to reform, data on GDP provide a reliable starting point for a comparative socio-economic analysis. According to WorldBankfigures,allthreecountriesregisteredsubstantialGDPdecreasesduringtheearly 1990s,withBelarusbeingthefirsttoresumegrowthin1996,followedbyRussia(in1997), and Ukraine (in 2000) ( Table 2) .
Judging by the GDP growth data contained in Table 2 , it is obvious that Belarus has outperformeditslargerEastSlavicneighbors.Itexperiencedthelowestaveragecontractionin thefirstfiveyearsofindependence (-8.1percent ),andthereaftergrewalmosttwiceorthree times as fast as Russia and Ukraine, respectively. In addition, Belarus did not experience output contraction after a 10.4 percent decline in 1995, while during the same period Russia experienced setbacks twice-in 1998 and 2009. 23 Onaverage,bothRussiaandUkrainelagged considerably behind Belarus, registering 0.6 and -1.6 growth rates for the entire period of independece, while Belarus registered a rather healthy average growth of 3.4 percent. By 23 Ukrainehasexperiencedfivesuchcontractionssince1995(WorldBank,2011a). Source: CompiledandcalculatedbyauthorsfromEBRD,2011a. 2003, Belarus had recovered its pre-reform GDP level, Russia attained recovery in 2006, while Ukraine has yet to re-attain its 1991 level of output (CIS STAT, 2011) . It is noteworthy that Belarus's economy did not register output contraction even in 2009, theglobaleconomy'sworstyearduringtheglobalfinancialcrisis.In2009,Belarus'sGDP grew by 0.2 percent according to CIS STAT and by 1.4 percent according to World Bank data, while Russia's economy shrank by 7.9 percent and Ukraine's by 15.1 percent (on the latter, seeÅslund,2009).Similarly,Belarusexperiencedamoreconfidentrecoveryin2010,withits GDP increasing by 7.6 percent, while in Russia and Ukraine output grew only by 4 and 3.7 percent respectively (CIS STAT, 2011; World Bank, 2011a) . Thus, the cumulative economic resultofthefirst20yearsofindependencehasbeenquitedifferentforBelarus,Russia,and Ukraine, with Belarus nearly doubling its output, Ukraine losing almost one-third, and Russia being somewhere in the middle with a 12.3 percent gain (Fig. 1) . Table 2 also shows that Russia is the wealthiest of the three republics in per capita terms, followed by Belarus and Ukraine. It is evident, that despite being resource poor, Belarus has increased its position relative to Ukraine, but continued to lag behind Russia.
Wages and Pensions
Wages and pensions constitute the basic income indicator at the microeconomic level. Because of the unstable macroeconomic situation in most post-communist countries during DataonwagesshowthatRussiahasbeentheleaderamongitsEastSlavicpeers,evenin the turbulent 1990s. In the wake of the commodity boom of the last decade, Russian wages shot up in nominal terms, putting the country far ahead of both Belarus and Ukraine. In fact, the latter should not have been lagging too much considering its reliance on commodityexports.However,itwasBelaruswhichactuallymovedclosertoRussia'snominalwage levels (Table 3) . This move could be partly attributed to centralized wage-setting policies in Belarus, which were absent in Ukraine. Thus, on average for the period, Russian wages were 1.6 times Belarusian wages and 2.1 times Ukrainian wages; in turn, Belarusian wages were 1.3 times Ukrainian wages.
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In 2008, Belarus had 2.5 million pensioners for 4.6 million workers (a retirement ratio of 1.88 workers per pensioner); Russia-39 million for 68 million workers (a 1.77 ratio); and Ukraine-13 million for 20 million (only 1.6). Comparing the data on pensions in U.S. dollars, one can observe some trends similar to those with wages in nominal terms, while quite different in relative terms. Nominally, Russian pensions have frequently been higher, but by 2009 they became the lowest among the three countries as a percentage of wages (Table 3) . By contrast, although Ukrainian pensions have often been the lowest in nominal terms, at least in 2009 they were the highest relative to wages.
Income Distribution and labor Productivity
The comparative analysis of wages and pensions above indicates that in Belarus the governmentappearstohavedoneabetterjobofchannelingpositivemacro-leveloutputperformance to the micro-level, thus ensuring a broad base for economic growth-an assumption supported by World Bank analysts.
25 By contrast, Russia and Ukraine have had their positive 24 Author calculations using the averages reported for 1993-2010 and 2001-2010 periods in GDP growth largely concentrated in specific sectors (e.g., oil) and geographical locations (e.g., capitals and resource-rich areas), with only marginal spillovers to the wider economy, at least as far as individual average incomes are concerned. This assumption is supported by Table 4 , which shows that Belarus has consistently reported the most equitable income distribution, although the shift in Ukraine's position since the early 2000s cannot be discounted. In fact, Belarus's levels of inequality as measured by the Gini Index closely correspond to those of Scandinavian countries, arguably the most socially equitable in the world (Finland-0.269, Norway-0.258,Sweden-0.250),whereasRussia'sGinicoefficientsaresimilartothoseof more inequitably developed economies such as United States (0.408) or United Kingdom (0.360) (UNDP, 2010b ). An additional confirmation of Belarus's relatively more "equal" economy can be taken from national wage statistics by sector and region. If one were to take, for example, the average nominal monthly wage as a benchmark, then in Belarus the deviation from it has been lowest both in the 1990s and at present. By contrast, in Russia and Ukraine large differences are evident both between the capital regions and the provinces, and betweenthewealthierindustrialandfinancialsectorsvis-à-visagriculturalandpublic-sector workers (Table 5) .
No internationally recognized reports point to extreme inequality in Belarus; in fact, the opposite arguement has been made (Istomina, 2007) . There are no oligarchs, Russian and Inequality also matters as a labor productivity factor. According to various studies, includingthosecommissionedbytheOECD (Aghionetal.,1999; Lloyds-Ellis,2000; Alam et al., 2005) , substantial increases in inequality tend to coincide with falling labor productivity as workers lose motivation to work harder in belief that their extra efforts would contribute only to the rich, but not to national welfare in general. It is, then, important to compare labor productivity dynamics in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine in order to see if the more equitable income distribution in Belarus has had any impact. Although methodologically such a comparison is hampered by the lack of appropriate statistics, one can overcome this by calculating labor productivity dynamics as a change in GDP per person (see Table 4 ). for 1996-2009 is almost the same as in resource-rich Russia and noticeably higher than in Ukraine. It may be the case, then, that robust labor productivity growth in Belarus, despite the lack of abundant natural resources, has been to some extent facilitated by its lower level of inequality, which has helped maintain workforce motivation in a largely state-owned economy with limited competition and opportunities to maximize one's income. Belarus's labor productivity growth is even more impressive if one takes into account the relatively stable workforce in the country since the mid-1990s, as reflected in steadily declining unemployment and rising workforce participation rates. Indeed, higher productivity growth can to a great extent be determined by a shrinking workforce and rising unemployment, which might have been the case in Ukraine. By contrast, Belarus managed to register productivity gains without substantial workforce losses (Table 6 ).
Well-Being and Social Infrastructure
Solid GDP growth and more equitable income distribution have arguably placed Belarus aheadofRussiaandUkraineintermsofwell-being.However,qualityoflifedependsnot only on one's income, but also on maintenance of towns and roads and provision of social infrastructure. Based on visual observations beyond the confines of the capital cities of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, we are convinced that Belarus is decidedly ahead of its larger EastSlavicneighborsonallthesecounts.Whilethispointofviewishardtosubstantiatewith statistical data, a comparison of public expenditures and key social services and infrastructure indicators may provide some insights. The available data demonstrate that Belarus consistently spent much more on education and health care as a share of GDP than did Russia or Ukraine: on average 5.8 percent of GDP was spent on education from 1991 to 2009, compared to a mere 3.7 percent in Russia and 5.1 percent in Ukraine. Similarly, over the same period an average 4.8 percent of Belarus's GDP wasspentonhealthcare,comparedtoonly3.6percentforbothRussiaandUkraine (UNICEF, 2011).
TheefficiencyofBelarus'srelativelyhigherlevelsofpublicspendingoneducationand healthcarecanbeverifiedbyexaminingselectedindicatorswidelyregardedaspivotalfor both types of public goods. For education, such indicators typically include enrolment data and student/teacher ratios. While there is no striking difference in basic and tertiary enrolment among the three countries, pre-primary and upper-secondary enrolments in Belarus have been muchhigherthaninbothRussiaandUkraine,afactthatreflectstheformer'sconsistency of funding at all levels in contrast to the latter two countries. Similarly better have been the pupil/teacher ratios in Belarusian schools at different levels ( Table 7) .
The Belarusian government has continued to maintain a broad network of specialized educational facilities for children established during the Soviet period-namely, arts, music, and sports schools, as well as multi-activity youth centers-not only in the big cities, but also in most towns and even large villages. Most importantly, due to steady public funding these facilities have remained widely affordable-a typical one-year course at an arts or music school costs less than $50 (Detskiye Shkoly, 2011). Similarly affordable have been preschool facilities-parents would generally pay around $10-$15 per month, or less than 5 percent of an average monthly wage, for subsidized meals for their children. In Russia and Ukraine, theprovisionofout-of-schoolfacilitiesfortheyounghassignificantlydeclinedsinceSoviet times, most probably due to lesser public funding and worse public administration. While there are no reliable statistics in this regard, available individual and media reports tend to support the view that Belarus has again been more advanced with provision and maintenance of the educational infrastructure. In health care, relatively better public funding is likely one of the key reasons for the superior standing of Belarus on indicators traditionally associated with well-developed medical systems. The key measure in this regard is life expectancy, and in Belarus it has not only been higher than in Russia or Ukraine throughout their first two decades of independence (Table 8 ), but in 2009 also approached the level of upper-middle-income countries according totheWorldHealthOrganization'sclassification(WHO,2011).Incontrast,lifeexpectancyin both Russia and Ukraine has remained at a level typical of lower-middle-income countries.
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Infant mortality, another vital indicator of health care, has also been much lower in Belarus than in Russia and Ukraine, having approached the levels of advanced countries by 2010. In contrast, despite substantial declines in infant mortality in both Russia and Ukraine during the firstdecadeofthe2000s,bothcountriesstillregisteredlevelslastreportedinBelarusinthe late 1990s. Such a contrasting picture may be the result of a modernization program, launched in the early 2000s, for all maternity hospitals in Belarus. Reports from medical specialists in thecountryimpliedthatnewmedicalequipmentallowedfortreatmentofdifficultmaternity cases, thus saving the lives of children who might otherwise have died.
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Asignificantlylowerincidenceofsuchdeceasesashepatitis,tuberculosis,andHIValso atteststothehigherqualityofBelarus'smedicalsystem.RegardingHIV,forexample,the frequencyofnewregisteredcasesinBelaruswaslessthanone-fifththenumberinRussia,and one-fourth that in Ukraine (Table 8) .
Greaterexpenditureonhealthcareshouldalsobereflectedinahealthierworkforceand better infrastructure provision, which can be compared using the available data. According totheWorldHealthOrganization,goodmedicalinfrastructureimpliesasufficientnumberof hospital beds and radiotherapy units, and a decent health care workforce is associated with highratiosofphysicians,nurses,dentists,andpharmacists.Onallthesecounts(apartfrom the ratio of pharmacists) Belarus has been far ahead of Russia and Ukraine in the last decade, as can be seen in Figure 2 .
Composite Indicators of Well-Being
According to one of the most reputable composite indicators of overall well-being, the UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram'sHumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI),Belarusranked 61st in 2010, ahead of all CIS countries, including Russia (65) and Ukraine (69) (UNDP, 2010a). In 2011, Belarus was 65th on the list, but still ahead of other CIS countries (UNDP 2011) . 29 In the 2011 Legatum Prosperity Index ranking of 110 countries, Belarus was 50th-ahead of all CIS countries and even one position ahead of Latvia (Legatum Institute, 2011) . 30 27 It is noteworthy in the context of this comparison that in 1986, Belarus received 70 percent of radionuclides discharged during the Chernobyl' disaster (Ioffe, 2007) . 28 Furthermore, a national maternity center was built in Minsk for particularly severe cases, and plans call for the opening of similar centers in all regional capitals (Davydova, 2007; Struzhinskaya, 2009) . 29 HDIcombinespercapitaGNIPPPwithlifeexpectancyatbirth,meanyearsofschooling,andexpectedyearsof schooling (for details, see footnote 8 in Clem, 2011 , which follows this paper in this symposium-Ed.). 30 The Legatum index is based on eight groups of variables (economy, entrepreneurship, governance, education, health, safety and security, personal freedom, and social capital). to rural residents as well as to many people employed in the food processing and other industries dependent on inputs from agriculture. Well-developed agriculture not only ensures food security for the country but also is essential for proper maintenance of the countryside and helpspreservetheBelarusianculturalheritage.Inaddition,harvestedfieldsandpasturesfull of cattle look more attractive than roadsides overgrown with unmown grass, thus creating a more positive tourist image for the country. To compare the state of agriculture in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, one can look into such indicators as output, workforce, and investment. According to the CIS statistical database (CIS STAT, 2011), only Belarus managed to regain its 1991 level of agricultural output by 2010 (Fig. 3) . In 2010, the output produced on all types of farms in Belarus exceeded the 1991 level by almost 16 percent. By contrast, Russia and Ukraine fell short of their 1991 levels of agricultural output by a quarter and a fifth respectively (Fig. 3) , with land abandonment in Russia a widespread phenomenon (Ioffe et al., 2004) . Belarus'sstrongerperformanceinagriculturelikelyreflectsthestate'sgreaterfinancial commitment than in Ukraine and Russia. Since 2003, the State Rural Development Program, launched by Lukashenka, has focused on the upgrading of machinery, housing construction, and changes in management practices. The legal status of most collective farms has been transformed to allow the participation of private investors, and for the sake of experiment, some 120 farms in the Minsk region were assigned by central authorities to selected entrepreneurs from the capital for the purpose of improving management and increasing production.Inthepastfiveyearsnearly1,500largervillagesthroughoutthecountrywere transformed into modern agricultural settlements (agrogorodki), with 68 thousand new apartments for young working families built in them (Zhizn na Sele, 2010). State-backed loans havealsobeenprovidedtofinancepurchasesofnewtractors,trucks,harvesters,andother farm machinery.
Finally, government officials have pledged to continue reforming agriculture to make it more competitive, in line with WTO requirements. It was announced that state support wouldbeconcentratedondrainage,soilcalcification,animalbreeding,agriculturalresearch, Physicians nurses, and hospital beds are per 10,000 people; dentists and pharmacists are per 100,000 people; and radiotherapy units are per 1,000,000 people. Source: WHO(2011). andtraining (Gosudarstvennaya,2005) .Otherthantheseareas,policymeasurestosupport agriculturewouldbegroupedinaccordancewithWTOmethodology,andwouldbeprovided onlyforspecificprograms.
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Such continuous state support of agriculture in Belarus is one of the main reasons why nearly 90 percent of food sold in the country has been of local origin (Kunitsky, 2011) , whereas in Russia close to half of all consumed foodstuffs is now imported (Miloserdov, 2011) , with Ukraine being closer to Belarus than to Russia in terms of the share of imports (about 12 percent of food retail sales) (Panchenko, 2009) . 33 State support of agriculture in Russia and Ukraine has plummeted since the Soviet period, and farmers are largely left to their own devices. The outcome of Belarusian policies in agriculture can be measured using such indicators as output per capita and grain yields (Figs. 4 and 5) . Throughout 11 months of 2010, Belarus earned $2.9 billion for its food exports, of which $2.4 billion went to Russia (Prodovol'stvennyy, 2011) . From 1995 to 2009, Belarus had the highest per capita agriculture production in all but three years, and the highest grain yield since 2003. This seems quite remarkable given that the country has relatively poorer soil than Ukraine and Russia's south. To summarize, it seems that the laissez-faire attitudes toward agriculture adopted in RussiaandUkrainehaveturnedouttoberatherlessefficientthanBelarus'scentral-planning approach, despite its inherent problems and setbacks.
CONClUDING COMMENTS
Given the scale of the current economic crisis, it appears rather evident that Belarus needs to introduce without delay several fundamental changes in its economy. A commitment to two such changes, namely, the elimination of multiple exchange rates of the Belarusian ruble and return of hard currency to exchange outlets, was announced in late August 2011 (Belyavskaya,2011b) andimplementedinSeptemberandOctober2011.However,Belarus 32 Milk production is a good example of such a program-based approach. Belarusian authorities have set the goal of producing 10.5 million tons of milk annually by 2016 (Belyavskaya, 2011a) , investing the equivalent of hundreds of millions of dollars into construction and renovation of milk farms across the country, with every rayon planned to haveatleastfivemoderndairyfarmslinkedtomilkprocessingplants.
33 Ukraine, however, has incomparably higher natural soil fertility than Belarus. should also trim its national programs in housing construction and agriculture, privatize most medium-sizedandsomelargebusinessestablishments,andsignificantlyexpandexports.Considering past achievements, it seems likely that the country should be able to accomplish these objectives.Forexample,inMayandJulyofthisyear,Belarus'sinter nationaltradebalance waspositiveforthefirsttimeinmanyyears.Duringthefirstninemonthsof2011,Belarus's exports doubled relative to the same period in 2010 (Kozhemyakin, 2011) -to some extent owing to the devaluation of the ruble.
By some accounts, a program of transferring many medium-sized enterprises into the hands of local businessmen (as an antidote to selling these assets to Russia) is being vigorously discussed in the corridors of power in Minsk (Romanchuk, 2011) . It is also helpful for Belarus that Russia is agreeing to lower natural gas prices, apparently in an attempt to signaltoUkrainethelikelybenefitsofenteringacustomsunionwithRussia(withBelarus and Kazakhstan). Ukraine's intransigence in this regard also benefits Belarus in another way. By launching the Nordstream natural gas pipeline to Germany, Russia will be able to bypassUkraine,whichiscurrentlythemajortransitregionforRussiangas.Butbecausethe volumeofgassoldbyRussiatoEuropeexceedsNordstream'scapacity,Belarusianlandtransit has a reasonable chance to be fully utilized at the expense of the Ukrainian transit, which explains Russia's interest in obtaining the remaining shares of the Beltransgaz pipeline for $2.5 billion.
The comparative analysis of post-communist socio-economic developments in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine tends to lead to a number of conclusions, among which is the key fact that Belarus has outperformed Russia and Ukraine on many counts. 34 As far as output is concerned, Belarus has registered the smallest contraction and most rapid recovery to the 1991 level, with average growth dynamics far exceeding those in Russia and Ukraine. While it has lagged Russia in the GDP per capita indicator as well as in absolute wage and pension levels, Belarus has had the most equitable income distribution, which most likely has contributed to robust productivity dynamics despite its relative paucity of natural resources. In the social sphere, the country has also achieved better results, due to higher public spending and most likelybecauseofthehigherqualityofadministration.Thishasbeenverifiedbycomparing some critical indicators in education (such as enrollments and teacher-student ratios) and health care (mortality, spread of disease, and infrastructure). Finally, in contrast to Russia and Ukraine, Belarus in the early 2000s embarked on a large-scale program of modernization in agriculture to improve the well-being of its rural inhabitants and ensure national food security and proper land maintenance. As a result, the country's productivity in agriculture has been much higher than in Russia or Ukraine, whether measured by output per capita or by yield data.
The argument most frequently enunciated by the Belarusian political regime's detractors is that the country's socio-economic achievements are only due to lasting discounts on natural gas and oil sold by Russia. Now that Russia has stopped "subsidizing" Belarus, the latter is experiencing a deep economic crisis. This turn of events, however, should have been foreseen all along, and steps should have been taken to lessen dependency on Russia.
There is no reason to doubt that Russia's lasting commitment to the aforementioned discounts has benefited Belarus. Suffice it to say that two Belarusian refineries have long receivedcheap(i.e.,withoutexporttariffs)Russiancrudeandselltherefinedproducttothe West at world prices. The IMF has estimated that this factor alone accounts for at least 5 percentofBelarus'sGDP-morespecifically,$5.9billionin2007and$8.2billionin2008 (IMF, 2010, p. 17) . And prices of Russian natural gas for Belarus were at times only one-fourth of thepriceatwhichthesameproductwassoldtoEUcountries.
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ButalthoughthescaleofRussia'seconomicaidtoBelarusissignificant,viewingitasan opportunitycostorasRussia'slostprofit(whichiswhatmostRussiancriticsofLukashenka tend to do) is not without fault. The Russian government, which authorized the aforementioned discounts in the past and which has reintroduced them starting in 2012, has not acted out of compassion and kindness, for Belarus is one of its two closest allies.
36 Their mutual border is transparent, there are no customs at that border, and individual travelers may use internal IDs whencrossingitsconfines.
37 There are two Russian military bases in Belarus, including an early missile detection station in Gantsevichi (near the city of Baranovichi), whose perceived 34 For recent assessments of the economic challenges confronting the latter two countries during and after the globalfinancialcrisis,seeÅslund ( )andGaddyandIckes(2010 .
35 OneoftheauthorsdevotedmuchofChapter4ofhis2008booktotheanalysisofthissituationanditspositive effect on Belarus's economy (Ioffe, 2008) . 36 The other is Kazakhstan. 37 Also Belarusians in Russia and Russians in Belarus do not require authorizations for employment. At the ports ofentryintoRussiaorBelarus,thecitizensofothercountriesreceiveajointRussia-Belarusmigrationform. significanceincreasedafterthelossofanidenticalmilitaryinstallationatSkrundainLatvia; another base is a submarine monitoring station in Vileika, northwest of Minsk. 38 Scores of Belarusian military personnel study in Russian schools, and the Belarusian army's munitions are all either made in Russia or are a product of Russia-Belarus industrial cooperation. The Belarusian army may be the most battle-trained in the CIS and as such protects Russia from theWest.ThefactthatNATOdoesnotthreatenRussia'sterritorialintegrityisnotacceptedas avalidargumentbyRussia'sinfluentialnational-patrioticcamp,andtherearemanynationally recognized political experts in Russia who believe that the aforementioned assets of Belarus are worth paying for. 39 By some accounts, there is a powerful Belarusian lobby in Moscow (Suzdal'tsev, 2010), although it was noticeably weakened when Moscow's Mayor YuriyLuzhkovwasfiredbyPresidentMedvedev.
The history of world trade features many special economic relationships. They exist betweenChinaandSingapore,betweentheU.S.andIsrael,withintheEU,andforalong time between the U.K. and many of its former colonies. One may argue that the relationship between Russia and Belarus is even more special than the ones mentioned above, as Belarus has not yet cut the umbilical cord connecting it with its large neighbor. But if the cord is still intact, taking advantage of these relationships by Belarus can hardly be viewed as opportunism, particularly given that in 1998 both countries signed a union treaty which includesaclauseaboutcreatingalevelplayingfieldintheeconomiesofthetwocountries (Soglasheniye, 1998).
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It is generally known that Russia's leadership suffers from time to time from bouts of doubt about these bilateral agreements and more or less frequently re-evaluates them with an eye toward possible change. Most observers agree that currently Moscow faults Belarus for its reluctance, even at a time of crisis, to sell its most lucrative assets to Russian oligarchs. Russia's expectations of such sales have thus far proven wrong and prompted the country's policymakersinlate2009toreconsiderthepriceofitsmaterialsupportofBelarus.However, in the spring of 2010 Belarus began to receive Venezuelan oil (later replaced by Azeri light), transportedthroughtheOdessa-Brodypipelineonthebasisofbilateralswapschemes.This relatively unexpected development prompted Russia in December 2010 to revoke the export tariffs on all Russian oil sold to Belarus.
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In the West, Belarus is frequently castigated not so much for its "unreformed" economy as for its poor record in human rights, including mistreatment of the opposition. Although this paper is not intended to be focused on politics, we take the liberty of hypothesizing that Belarus's economic success is not solely based on taking advantage of favorable terms of tradewithRussiaandpassingonthebenefitstomostBelarusiansratherthantotheprivileged elites. Belarus's economic success is also rooted in a degree of harmony between much of its society and the political regime-a degree which is higher than in Russia and Ukraine. "Not one of his international peers evidences so profound an understanding of his or her people," wrote The Washington Post about Vladimir Putin (Peters, 2011) . We submit that Lukashenka has a similar understanding of the inhabitants of Belarus. 38 Russia pays no fees for the use of these bases. 39 Such experts include but are not limited to Mikhail Delyagin, Alexander Dugin, Sergey Kara-Murza, Sergey Mikheyev, Alexander Prokhanov, and Konstantin Zatulin.
40 The1998agreementstipulatesthatpricesofexportedproductssubjecttoregulationaretoreplicatedomestic prices in the exporting country. Alexander Lukashenka and members of his government refer to this agreement each time they criticize Russia for raising prices on hydrocarbons earmarked for Belarus. 41 It should be noted that the swaps with Venezuela showed that Belarus has an opportunity to lessen its dependency on Russia.
Although public opinion in Russia and Ukraine has been hostile to privatization or rather tothewayitwasconducted,privatizationwasnonethelessfiercelypromotedinbothcountries, breeding corruption, cynicism, and distrust of the authorities. Russian and Ukrainian authorities made a commitment to honor civil liberties (e.g., multi-party system, free and fair elections, and unrestricted public rallies) only to curtail them arbitrarily and at times harshly. In contrast, the social compact established and maintained between the regime and society in Belarus was explicitly based on surrendering some personal liberties (which most Belarusians didnotconsiderworthyofmajorsacrificetobeginwith)inexchangeforahighdegreeof social safety and equity. There are good reasons to believe that Belarusians have thus far en masse supported this kind of equilibrium. In a 2007 national survey taken (at a time of the boominconsumption)byareputableopposition-orientedpollingfirm,64.1percentofthe respondents subscribed to the notion that Lukashenka has been successful in installing order inthecountry (Ioffe,2008,p.187) .Ourobservationspromptustoassertthat"order"isa composite and "sacred" condition in the East Slavic world, a condition antithetical to the free-for-all which subsumes corruption, social inequality, and crime. In a December 2010 post-electionnationalpollbyasimilarlyorientedpollingfirm,only17.4percentofrespond-ing Belarusians approved of protest actions and only 18.9 percent acknowledged that they opposed the regime (Ioffe, 2011a) .
Werealizethatourhypothesisofharmonymayevokeoutrageamongsomereaders.How can one commend a regime commonly referred to as dictatorial? After all, Western media routinely portray the people of Belarus as the regime's victims. Not only that-existing social research in the context of Belarusian as well as Russian and Ukrainian area studies is, in the words of Sam Greene (2011) "almost inevitably reduced to a dependent variable" (i.e., social results), which is the product of politics and the political economy. But the inverse is true as well (i.e., that society may produce the political economy and the political regime) and maybe even more so, which is what shrewd Belarus watchers make clear, however inadvertently at times. In this regard, the pronouncements of Lukashenka's detractors are more revealing than those of his supporters. For example, the late Vitali Silitski, the founding director of the U.S.-funded Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies in Minsk and a leading analyst representing the opposition, suggested that the Lukashenka regime incorporated "the outlook and the political culture of the average Belarusian" into its core framework (quoted in Ioffe, 2008, p.153) .KonstantinSkuratovich,aveteranjournalistandalsocriticofLukashenka,recently stated that "the fault of [his] regime … is in the fact that it is too close to people, however paradoxical it may seem" (Neklyayev-Skuratovich, 2011) .
"Disturbing though it may sound, Lukashenka … proved to have greater national responsibility and integrity than the entire Orange elite in Ukraine," wrote Balasz Jarabik of the EuropeanthinktankFRIDE (Jarabik,2009 ).Thefive-wordqualifieratthebeginningofthat positive statement (by a professional promoter of democracy) only makes it more compelling. "The … myth which needs debunking," Jarabik (2011) also wrote, … is that Alexander Lukashenka himself is a singular phenomenon. His rule is commonly perceived as iron-fisted. Despite the authoritarian repression of the opposition, however, he would not have been able to rule for 16 years without public consent.…[Lukashenka]isthereflectionofanupgradedversionoftheSovietmodel ofpoliticswhichhasbeenwidelyaccepted.Hissocialcontractisbasedon[steady] economic growth and a more equal distribution of wealth. (Jarabik, 2011b) .
These observations are echoed in a reader's suggestive comment in the Belarus Digest, an Internet portal set up by a group of Belarusian graduates of leading Western schools. The comment was in response to Jarabik's article titled "Belarus after Sanctions: The Lost Dictator" (Jarabik,2011a) .Morespecifically,itfocusedonasentenceinthearticlestating"Itis not only about Lukashenka but [also] about a society that approves and supports order and stability and does not mind a lack of freedom in return." "So you are saying that the people of Belarus chose to live in this way, and yet you insist we should come in and change their ways?" wrote the reader who introduced herself as Anon, "What happened to all that talk of freedomofchoice?Isitalljust'bigtalk',andinrealityyoujustwanttovalidateyourown viewsbyforcingthemonothers,justlikereligiousorganizationsthroughouthistory?"
Within a month after the forcible dispersal of a post-election rally in Minsk on December 19,2010,theassociatesoftheCarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeacepublishedthree items, in which condemnations of the Belarusian regime's actions were interspersed with statements like "The losers of Sunday's events are President Lukashenka himself and the constructive elements of the opposition" (Shumilo-Tapiola, 2010); and "Lukashenka remains popularbecauseherepresentsstabilityinuncertaintimes" (RojanskiandCollins,2011) .
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So returning to the harmony hypothesis, our point is not to "commend," which would tendtobeavaluejudgment,buttounderscorewhatseemstobeareasonableobservationthat Lukashenkathusfarhasreflectedtheaspirationsofmany,ifnotmost,ordinary Belarusians. Moreover, the case can be made that out of three (or 3½) national leaders-the Putin-Medvedev duo, Yanukovich, and Lukashenka-the latter actually is the most "democratic." Unlike his EastSlaviccolleagues,Lukashenkasidedwiththecommonfolkand"nipped oligarchyinthe bud," whereas Putin-Medvedev and Yanukovich are widely viewed as protégés of the oligarchy, and more often than not as covert oligarchs themselves. But because Western propaganda madeBelarus,notRussiaorUkraine,"Europe'slastdictatorship,"itisaposterchildeven in those countries. For example, when Russia's liberal Westernizers castigate Russia's political regime, they say that the difference between it and Lukashenka's rule is purely cosmetic (e.g.,seeGol'ts,2011).Weagree.AsforUkraine,itsOrangeRevolutionisnolongerfondly remembered inside that country and Western political commentators aver that its spirit has been "squandered" (Levy, 2009) . At times, it seems, Ukraine is dangerously approaching the status of a failed state (Wilson, 2009) .
"Our liberty is bedlam, and our dream is order in that bedlam," quipped Mikhail Zhvanetsky(2010),astand-upcomedianbornandraisedinUkraine'sOdessa.Ourinsiders' insights lead us to believe that Zhvanetsky's dictum appears to be more meaningful than the writings of political commentators who see the likes of Lukashenka, Putin, and Yanukovich as the sources of all evil, and the societies over which they preside as their victims.
Robert Putnam famously showed in his analysis of local communities in Italy that democracy builds upon homegrown traditions of civility and trust. If, however, "laws … are made to be broken, [and] fearing others' lawlessness, people demand sterner discipline" (Putnam, 1993, p. 115) , then a nourishing environment for autocratic regimes arises. Writing about Russian political culture, a political scientist with close ties to the Kremlin acknowledged that "the personification of political institutions and the great role of leaders … make up for the deficiency of mutual trust [emphasis added-G.I.] . That is why Russians lean not to institutions but to strong personalities" (Nikonov, 2007) . Belarusians likewise do, but perhaps evenmoreso.Indeed,likeRussiansandUkrainians,Belarusiansarepermeatedbyadeficit of trust, loose ethical standards, and a winner-take-all mentality. But on top of that state of mind, they have not as yet developed a clear-cut identity (Ioffe, 2008; Leshchenko, 2011) and often feel like pawns in a grand geopolitical game between Russia and the West. Under such circumstances, establishing and maintaining order by authoritarian means may after all not be a losing proposition, and the statistical data presented in this paper may prove us right. It is of course an open question whether the current economic distress will destroy the harmony between regime and society beyond repair. If it does, a time of trouble lies ahead for Belarus.
